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Introduction

Following the pioneering work by King and Levine (1993), a large literature aiming to assess the implications
of financial activities on economic development has rapidly grown (see, among others, a survey by Levine,
2005). From a theoretical perspective, only a limited number of works analyze the mechanisms through which
financial intermediation impacts on economic growth through physical capital accumulation (Trew, 2014;
Bucci et al., 2018), human capital formation (De Gregorio, 1996; De Gregorio and Kim, 2000; Bucci and
Marsiglio, 2018) and technological progress (Pagano, 1993; Morales, 2003; Trew, 2008). From an empirical
point of view, instead, an extensive body of studies discusses whether financial intermediation is beneficial
or detrimental for growth, and the most recent view on this issue concludes that answering such a question is
not simple at all, since the relation between economic growth and finance is non-monotonic, and most likely
bell-shaped (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015; Bucci et al., 2018).
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This clearly suggests that predicting how financial and economic activities interact is all but trivial. This
type of conclusion has been reinforced after the recent global financial crisis, which has shown us that the
financial and real sides of an economy are interconnected in a quite complex fashion which we still do not
fully understand. Indeed, very little is known about the mechanisms through which a financial crisis can give
rise to an economic crisis and how this in turn may feed the financial crisis again. Our paper wishes to shed
some light on this issue by analyzing the way in which financial contagion and economic development affect
each other and how specific policies can be used to improve the overall economic and financial outcomes.
Several papers, especially following the great recession in 2008, have tried to analyze how a financial crisis
can give birth to financial contagion. By relying on either an empirical (Mistrulli, 2011; Baur, 2012; Mondria
and Quintana-Domeque, 2013) or a theoretical (Allen and Gale, 2000; Martinez–Jaramillo et al., 2010,
Ait–Sahalia et al, 2015) approach, extant literature focuses mainly on risk transmission between financial
intermediaries and within the financial system, eventually accounting for transmission across national borders
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Mishkin, 2011; Campello et al., 2010).1 To the best of our knowledge, however,
none of these works analyzes what contagion within the financial system implies for the real side of an
economy and how economic activities at macroeconomic level in turn determine financial contagion. This is
exactly the goal of our paper which wishes to conceptualize the mutual links between an economy’s real and
financial sides with particular emphasis on financial contagion. Specifically, we rely on an epidemiological
approach to characterize how the exchange of assets between banks can determine the overall health status of
the financial system, which determines the level of productivity in the whole economy. Since macroeconomic
activity affects the number of asset exchanged between banks, the financial and economic sides are mutually
related. Our model allows for two different equilibria: in the non-speculative equilibrium the level of per
capita income is maximal, while in the speculative equilibrium it is reduced by financial contagion (which
depends on both economic and financial factors). We also show that the convergence to the speculative
equilibrium may give rise to economic fluctuations even in absence of random shocks, and such fluctuations
are simply driven by the interactions between the economic and financial systems. By allowing for a spatial
dimension we also analyze how the presence of financial contagion in some specific region may generate
dramatic effects even in regions far away from those in which the contagion initially occurs. This extension
allows us to provide a simple and intuitive explanation of why the recent financial crisis has rapidly become
a global phenomenon, but also to provide a straightforward explanation of the widely-spread argument
claiming that policy coordination across regions is effectively needed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the possible channels of financial contagion according
to extant literature. All the reviewed studies focus on the implications of contagion on the financial industry
itself and none accounts for its broader macroeconomic implications, which is the main goal of our paper.
By taking an epidemiological approach, section 3 presents our a-spatial model of financial contagion and
economic development which is entirely summarized by a system of differential equations. We analyze first
the case in which the financial system affects the real economy, and then the case in which financial and
economic systems are mutually related. We show that according to which parametric configuration holds
true, and specifically according to how the effective risk-transmission rate and the effective risk-decay rate
compare, the economy may converge either to a non-speculative or a speculative equilibrium. Section 4
presents our spatial model in which financial activities and capital may diffuse across the entire spatial
economy; the model is thus described by a system of partial differential equations. We show that the
presence of financial contagion in some specific region may generate dramatic effects even in regions far
away from those in which the contagion initially occurs. Section 5 as usual presents concluding remarks
and highlights directions for future research. Appendix A presents a generalization of the explicit results
discussed in the body text, while appendix B extends our analysis to the case in which the exchange of asset
1

The extent and speed of contagion is indeed the most striking novelty of the recent global financial crisis, in the sense that
a rapid transmission occurred not only across different segments of the financial market but also across countries (see Beck et
al., 2010).
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between banks is proportional to the level of per capita income rather than per capita capital showing that
also in this setting our main qualitative results still apply.

2

Financial Contagion in Interbank Markets

The financial and banking industry2 is a complex system linking households, firms, and governments wishing
to make payments, invest savings, issue or adopt credit, trade ownership stakes and assets, reduce financial
risk, or disseminate financial information. Therefore, the financial sector is far more important than its
direct share in the whole economy would suggest, and any turmoil affecting this industry can have dramatic
effects also on the real economy as we will later clarify. The most important functions of the financial system
consist mainly of: easing the exchange of goods and services by facilitating payments; pooling savings and
allocating the available resources from lenders to borrowers; managing different liquidity and maturity needs
by intermediating between short maturity lenders preferring and long maturity borrowers; and providing
risk management. While the first one is the typical and most characteristic function of any financial system,
allocating capital deals primarily with investing a financial institution’s outside liabilities (i.e., obligations
towards nonfinancial entities) into outside assets (i.e., claims on nonfinancial institutions). This process
normally entails converting illiquid assets into money-like claims. The resulting maturity and liquidity
transformation leaves banks vulnerable to a loss of funding, and interbank borrowing and lending serves
precisely the scope of helping banks to manage the risk of fluctuations in their outside funding. Banks also
help corporations manage their exposures to different categories of economic risk (stemming, for example,
from exchange rates or interest rates, or else commodity-prices oscillations) through derivatives and other
contracts. Again, banks hedge this risk by trading with other banks. The need for a place where all these
exchanges between banks can occur represents therefore the most important motivation behind the existence
of an interbank market in modern and globalized financial systems. As a result of the variegated functions
that banks nowadays perform, interbank linkages are thus the key to the well-functioning of a financial
system, since they allow banks with liquidity-shortages to borrow from banks with liquidity-surpluses. In a
word, by redistributing funds among banks, the interbank market stabilizes the whole banking system. At
the same time, however, the dense linkages existing between banks may also become a source of financial
contagion through which solvency or liquidity problems of a single bank can spread and spill over to other
banks as well, thus destabilizing the entire system.
Although the growing interconnectedness of the financial institutions is now considered one of the most
important factors contributing to the recent global financial crisis of 2007–2008, it is also among the least
understood, as the following questions are still at the center of the academic and policymaking debate. What
are the most relevant channels through which financial contagion can take place in the interbank market?
Does more interbank connectivity promote stability (via risk-sharing), or does it instead lead to greater
fragility (by increasing the opportunity for contagion)? In other words, what is the role that the interaction
between banks in a globalized financial system concretely plays in the propagation of a systemic shock
and, following this shock, how is the interbank market’s stability eventually affected by its structure? Is it
possible to quantitatively assess the economic consequences of the widespread losses in the financial system
due to shocks that arise from particular parts of it? In order to find a possible answer to these fundamental
questions, in the last decade there has been an upsurge in the empirical as well as theoretical works on these
issues. These works can be classified into two broad categories according to the approach used to describe
interbank dynamics. On the one hand, network-based studies explicitly model the links between banks
trying to micro-found their behavior and their interactions; due to the complexity of the banking industry’s
structure most of the results are derived from numerical simulations and such results largely depend on the
specific assumptions made on the nature of these links. On the other hand, epidemiological studies take
2

For the sake of simplicity in the remainder of the paper we will use the terms financial institution and bank interchangeably.
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an aggregative approach to model the interactions between specific bank subgroups without modeling the
behavior of any individual bank; this simplification in the structure of the banking industry allows to derive
analytical results that provide a neat characterization of the possible outcomes. We will now briefly review
such alternative approaches and their latest developments.
Because the structure of modern financial systems resembles, due to its dense connections between financial as well as nonfinancial entities, that of network-based industries (such as transport, power generation, or
communications), most of the recent literature in the field adapts the existing network theory (see Newman,
2010, for an introduction to this theory) to the analysis of interbank interactions in order to emphasize
the existence of four different sources of contagion occurring through the links of banks’ balance sheets
(see Glasserman and Young, 2016, for an extensive survey). The first, and probably the most intuitive, is
represented by the occurrence of a negative shock to the value of a bank’s assets: a drop, say, in the value
of a bank’s outside assets (for example, a downturn in an industrial sector to which the bank has made
sizeable loans) is initially absorbed by the same bank’s net worth. However, if the negative shock is big
enough, the net worth of the bank is sooner or later wiped out, the bank becomes unable to fully repay all
of its liabilities, and it ultimately defaults. Moreover, if the bank’s payment shortfall is sufficiently large, it
can push another bank to default as well. In the end, an initial shock to one bank’s assets can spill over to
other banks, creating a cascade of defaults (Wagner, 2010). Similarly, a second type of contagion arises from
the fact that banks may have direct exposures to each other through borrowing and lending (Muller, 2006).
To be more specific, suppose that a bank is forced to pull funding from another bank. Such a behavior
can be triggered by an unexpected liquidity shock stemming, for example, from the reduction in the bank’s
deposits of nonfinancial entities. With its funding reduced, the bank needs to reduce its assets, as well. If
it withdraws its lending to a second bank, this one will in turn need to reduce its own lending, so creating
a funding run. Thus, while on the one hand interbank lending helps banks manage their liquidity risks, on
the other hand it also creates ways through which a shock can be propagated from one bank to another
one (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al. 2000; Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007;
Gai et al., 2011). Another pathway through which banks’ balance sheets may interact with each other in
generating financial contagion is via information disclosure. Banks may have common exposures through
their overlapping outside asset holdings (for example, real estate): a disclosure by one bank about its own
assets may lead creditors to make inferences about the assets held by other similar banks, so producing a
sort of “information contagion” (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008). A related branch of this literature highlights also the importance of within-network uncertainty as an amplifier of financial contagion in interbank
markets (Pritsker, 2013; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008). Finally, financial contagion can be originated
by a “fire sale”: if a bank is pushed to sell an illiquid asset (because of a shock that hits such an asset
and creates a cash-shortfall for the bank), then the price of the same asset can be driven down, with the
consequence that other banks (holding similar assets) may be forced to raise cash, as well. It is worth
noticing that this negative externality operates solely through the price drop of the initially sold illiquid
asset, and is independent on any payment obligation across banks. This source of financial contagion is
therefore illustrative of the possible trade-off that originates from the search for diversification of a bank’s
investments portfolio: investment diversification reduces risks for each bank, on the one side, but if all banks
hold similar diversified portfolios the system as a whole may be more vulnerable, on the other side (Caccioli
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2013).
Assessing how the stability of a financial system is ultimately affected by the structure of the interbank
links within a network is not easy because connectivity is at the same time a channel for diversifying risks
(which makes the financial system more stable) and a channel of contagion (which makes it less stable).
Several studies have attempted to analyze this issue (see Glasserman and Young, 2016). By measuring the
degree of connectivity through the probability of random connections, Nier et al. (2007) are among the
first to find a nonlinear, possibly non-monotonic (M-shaped) impact of this variable on the total number
of defaults in a network: increasing connectivity increases not only shock-transmission but also shock4

absorption, with the first effect dominating at a low level of connectivity and the second effect dominating
instead at a higher level. More recently, by relying on an agent-based setup Acemoglu et al. (2015) confirm
that interconnectedness not only improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks but it also
increases the possibilities of contagion. In particular, they conclude that a ring network always produces
the greatest number of defaults. By holding the network structure fixed, and instead varying the size of
an initial shock, they also infer that a completely connected network produces the least number of defaults
if the shock is small and the greatest number of defaults if the shock is large. Muller (2006) assesses the
potential for contagion in the Swiss interbank market using data on bilateral bank exposures and credit
lines within a simulation approach. Her conclusions suggest that the structure of the interbank linkages
has a considerable impact on the interbank market’s systemic stability. For one thing, the structure is
decisive for the optimal redistribution of the available liquidity within the system (if banks with excess
liquidity cannot pass it over to banks with a lack of liquidity, the banking system is definitely more prone to
contagion). For another, the structure is crucial for the banking system’s ability to absorb spillover effects
(in case of a default situation, homogeneous and dense interbank networks turn out to be more stable than
centralized and sparse networks). These findings are consistent with Allen and Gale’s (2000) showing that
“completeness” makes an interbank strucutre more robust to financial contagion.
Apart from such a network-based approach, and because of its similarity with an infectious disease,
financial contagion has also been modeled by borrowing from the mathematical epidemiology literature
(see Hethcote, 2000, for a review of epidemiological studies), which has also been successfully used in other
disciplines to explain the diffusion of computer viruses, change in behaviors, advertising and rumors. Such an
epidemiological approach has only recently been brought into the discussion of financial contagion, and the
most representative works are represented by Toivanen (2013) and Kostylenko et al. (2017). Different from
the network-based models which allow to distinguish across different sources of contagion, due to the richness
with which they can describe individual bank’s behavior and its interaction with other banks, epidemiological
models do not allow to clearly identify the possible sources of contagion but allow to explicitly describe
the contagion dynamics with the ultimate purpose to fully understand its underlying mechanisms. Both
Toivanen (2013) and Kostylenko et al. (2017) rely on a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemiological
model to describe interbank dynamics: banks can be susceptible to speculation, infected by speculation or
immunized from speculation after recovery from the infected phase. By interacting with infected ones, a
susceptible bank may become infected as well such that financial contagion may spread within the financial
sector exactly as a disease would diffuse across the human population. The ability of an epidemiological
characterization of financial contagion to clearly describe how contagion propagates at aggregate level is the
main advantage of this specific approach with respect to the more widely used network-based one. Using
data on large cross-border banks in Europe, Toivanen (2013) shows that the crisis has, indeed, divided
banks into two different categories: contagious and healthy (i.e., infected and susceptible, respectively).
Moreover, as some banks can in principle be more dangerous (infectious) to the whole banking system than
others, Toivanen (2013) also analyses whether the propagation of contagion is exacerbated by bank-specific
factors, and ultimately which ones. He shows that the larger the first failing bank is, the more widespread
the contagion will be; however, he also shows that other factors, including high clustering of the banking
system, a high bank’s connectivity, and large interbank loans, pose a greater systemic risk for the banking
system as a whole than a bank’s size.
Both the network and epidemiological approaches developed thus far to describe financial contagion
focus only on the interbank dynamics and the consequences of contagion on the banking industry. Our goal
in this paper is instead to analyze the macroeconomic implications of financial contagion, an issue which
extant literature has to a large extent completely neglected. In order to do so we rely on an epidemiological
approach which, because of its aggregative nature consistent with the typical macroeconomic framework,
is the most natural candidate to develop an analytically tractable economic-financial model. Different
from extant epidemiological literature, we assume that banks can be only susceptible to or infected by
5

speculation, meaning that upon recovery from speculation banks do not ever become immune. We believe
that this assumption, allowing to characterize financial contagion as in a susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model, represents interbank dynamics more realistically than in a SIR setup (where, instead, full
immunization from speculation can effectively be achieved, a scenario difficult to imagine in the real world
financial system). Moreover, different from existing epidemiological works which simply reinterpret the basic
model of infectious diseases in financial terms, we first modify it in order to account for the most important
features that characterize bank interactions and then integrate it in a traditional macroeconomic framework
to account for the mutual links between economic development and financial contagion. A more detailed
description of our epidemiological model of financial contagion follows.

3

The Baseline Model

We develop a simple model that analyzes how financial contagion arising from the financial system can
affect and be affected by the real economy. We focus on a setup with heterogeneous banks which, through
their normal business activities exchange assets, leading to transmission of risk from speculative to nonspeculative banks. Specifically, the assets of both groups of banks are in the form of loans and non-loan
assets, and non-loan assets may be either risky or non-risky . We assume that the two groups differ in the
share of their assets held in the form of loans and in the type of non-loan assets held: on the one-hand,
speculative banks hold only a small share of their assets in the form of loans and hold high-risk non-loan
assets, while on the other hand, non-speculative banks hold a substantial share of their assets in the form of
loans while also holding low-risk non-loan assets. We embed such a setting within an aggregative Solow-type
(1956) neoclassical growth model in which, through the loan channel (that allows financial intermediaries
to effectively funnel resources to the most productive uses in the economy), non-speculative banks positively
influence the total factor productivity, so determining the level of income per capita. The transmission of risk
from speculative to non-speculative banks affects capital accumulation through its impact on productivity.
Our goal is to analyze how the degree of financial contagion can affect the real economy with a special
emphasis on its level of economic development, proxied by the stock of per capita capital (we shall show
in appendix B that the results do not change even if we use per capita income as a proxy of economic
development).
In order to show more clearly our results and the different mechanisms that we wish to emphasize, we
proceed in two steps. In the first we assume that the rate at which risk is transmitted across banks is
exogenous. In this case, the direction of the relation between the financial and the real sides of the economy
goes from the former to the latter: the share of speculative banks in the economy affects negatively the
dynamics of physical capital accumulation, whereas capital is unable to affect the evolution of the share of
speculative banks. As a second step, we extend such a basic setup to a more realistic framework where the
risk-transmission rate is endogenous and dependent on the stock of per capita capital the economy is endowed
with. In this more interesting case, the direction of the relation between the economy’s financial and real sides
is twofold: the share of speculative banks affects the dynamics of capital investment, with the capital stock
being itself able, in turn, to affect the evolution of the share of speculative banks. Irrespective of the fact
that the risk-transmission rate is exogenous or endogenous, in both cases we find the possibility of multiple
equilibria, namely equilibria where the degree of financial contagion is either null or strictly positive. Our
setting allows us to characterize the determinants of such equilibria and their dynamic properties, ultimately
contributing to a better understanding not only of the complexity of the mutual relations between the
economic and financial systems, but also of how such relations might be the source of endogenous fluctuations
in per capita income, even in the absence of random shocks.

6

3.1

The Financial Side Affecting the Real Side

We consider a setting in which the interactions across banks in the financial sector are modeled as in a basic susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemiological framework3 (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Hethcote,
2000). The whole population of banks, Bt , is composed of two groups, non-speculative, Nt , and speculative,
St , such that at any time Bt = Nt + St . Both these two groups of banks hold assets ether in the form
of loans or in the form of non-loan assets, and their strategies differ according to the choice of which share
of assets to hold in the form of loans and to their chosen risk-profile in non-loan assets. While speculative
banks hold only a small share of their assets in the form of loans, non-speculative banks hold a substantial
share of loans. Moreover, while speculative banks opt for holding short-term very risky non-loan assets
(e.g., asset-backed securities, or junk bonds, among others), non-speculative banks hold in their portfolio
long-term, non-risky non-loan assets (e.g., perpetual bonds, for example). The size and the composition
of the financial sector changes over time according to business dynamics (some new banks are created and
others close down) and to the interactions between the two groups of banks. At any moment in time new
banks are created at a given rate 0 < b < 1, and we assume that newly created banks are all non-speculative
at birth but may become speculative themselves by trading assets with speculative banks. Indeed, as the
brief review of the previous section has made clear, due to everyday business interactions, speculative and
non-speculative banks normally do sell and buy assets from each other in the interbank market. As an
example, both the exchange of overnight loans in the reserve market and the exchange of personal/corporate
loans in the loan market lead to an exchange of assets between speculative and non-speculative banks.
Through these interbank exchanges, the overall high degree of risk characterizing the business profile of
speculative banks may be transmitted also to non-speculative banks (via solvency or liquidity problems of a
single bank), spreading across the entire financial system, such that financial contagion may take place. We
postulate that risk is transmitted from speculative to non-speculative banks at a rate θ > 0, measuring the
average number of asset transactions required for the risk-exposure of the portfolio of a non-speculative bank
to increase enough to be considered, in turn, speculative itself. High-risk assets held by speculative banks
have a finite duration η > 0, which determines the decay-rate of risk-exposure. We also assume that the life
span of banks is potentially infinite, however holding high-risk assets might lead banks to bankruptcy which
occurs with a certain probability 0 < d < 1, meaning that due to default reasons speculative banks may
cease to exist. Thus, while speculative banks leave the financial market with a positive probability, such a
probability is null for non-speculative banks. In light of the above characterization of the financial sector,
given the initial conditions, N0 ≥ 0, S0 ≥ 0, and B0 = N0 + S0 ≥ 0, the interactions between speculative
and non-speculative banks along with asset and vital business characteristics determine the flow of banks
between the two subgroups, meaning that the number of speculative, non-speculative and total banks evolve
according to the following differential equations:
Ṅt = bBt + ηSt − θ

Nt St
Bt

Nt St
− ηSt − dSt
Bt
= bBt − dSt

(1)

Ṡt = θ

(2)

Ḃt

(3)

The above equations state that the risk-transmission, that is the extent to which risk may propagate across
speculative and non-speculative banks is determined by θ NBt St t , where θ is the risk-transmission rate (meaSt
suring the average number of transactions required for risk-transmission to occur), and Nt B
represents the
t
3

For the sake of simplicity, we rely on one of the simplest epidemiological frameworks, namely the susceptible–infected–
susceptible model. More sophisticated setups which have been developed in the mathematical epidemiology literature (see,
among others, Imran et al., 2014; Sharomi and Malik, 2015; Thompson et al., 2016) could be considered as well, but this would
complicate our analysis without providing additional insights on the mutual relation between financial contagion and economic
development.
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number of random matchings per unit of time between the two groups of banks. Hence, for any θ > 0
St
and Nt > 0, the risk-transmission ultimately depends on the share B
(rather than the absolute number,
t
St ) of speculative banks in the banks population, suggesting that the level of transactions between banks
does not change with risk .4 Also note that the rate at which speculative banks leave the market (d) is
given by the probability of default induced by risk exposure: since non-speculative banks exchange assets
with speculative banks, they might become speculative banks and forced to default as well. Moreover,
the above model’s formulation is completely deterministic, since in line with the mathematical epidemiology
literature, we focus on a deterministic approximation of the stochastic model in which matching, and thus
the exchange of assets, between speculative and non-speculative banks occurs randomly. Focusing on such
a deterministic approximation of a stochastic framework allows us to analyze the implications of contagion
on average, obtaining thus a setup consistent with traditional macroeconomic models.5 As we shall see,
this allows us to develop an intuitive framework to characterize the mutual links between macroeconomic
outcomes and financial contagion.
St
t
By defining the share of non-speculative and speculative banks as nt = N
Bt and st = Bt , respectively, the
above system can be recast as follows:
ṅt = b(1 − nt ) + ηst − (θ − d)nt st

(4)

ṡt = θnt st − (η + b)st − dst (1 − st )

(5)

The above equations describe how the relative composition of the banking sector changes over time. In
particular, the spread of risk trough the exchange of assets implies that some non-speculative (Nt ) banks may
become speculative (St ) and thus the share of speculative banks (st ) may increase over time. Therefore, the
prevalence of speculative banks in the financial system entirely captures the contagion effects in the financial
system and thus in the following we shall refer to st as the “degree of financial contagion”. In particular, we
wish to understand what are the determinants of financial contagion and what are its potential implications
for economic development.
From the economic side we consider a Solow-type setting in which agents save a constant share 0 < v < 1
of their income. Output can be either consumed or invested to accumulate more capital or else to replace
depreciated capital. Specifically, output, Yt , is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
by employing capital Kt and labor Lt as follows: Yt = At Ktα L1−α
, where 0 < α < 1 measures the capital
t
share of income and At the total factor productivity (TFP). One of the most important roles of banks in
modern economies consists of funneling savings to those firms that are able to employ (scarce) resources
more efficiently, which in turn (at an aggregate level) results in a higher TFP (see, among others, Pagano,
1993; Morales, 2003; Trew, 2008; Bucci et al., 2018). In order to capture this effect, we assume that banks
determine the level of TFP and in particular we postulate that this level increases with the share of nonspeculative banks in the economy as follows: At = anβt , where a > 0 is a scale parameter and β > 0 measures
the efficiency of intermediation activity in affecting productivity.6 . By denoting with n > 0 the growth rate
of the labor force (coinciding with the population size, since we abstract from unemployment), the evolution
4

By relying on epidemiology terminology, we would say that risk-transmission is frequency dependent, rather than density
dependent (see Hethcote, 2000).
5
It may be possible to analyze also the stochastic version of our banking model which, in line with other studies on financial
contagion (see Glasserman and Young, 2016, for a recent survey), would take a network structure. In this framework banks
represent nodes within a specific fixed network of financial institutions and at random times a given bank exchanges assets with
some of its closest neighbors leading eventually to risk transmission. Apart from precluding analytical results, this alternative
formulation has the disadvantage of not being easily reconciled with the typical macroeconomic setup that we need to rely upon
in order to link the financial and the real sides of the economy. For this reason, we do believe that our approach based on the
deterministic approximation of such a stochastic model represents the most effective way to address our research questions.
6
Note that in our framework when all banks are non-speculative (nt = 1) the level of the TFP is maximal (At = a), while the
presence of speculative banks (nt < 1) reduces the TFP (At < a). This is due to the fact that, unlike non-speculative banks,
the speculative ones hold only a small share of their assets in the form of loans, which are the means to channel funds towards
the most productive uses in an economy. Since such a share is small, speculative banks have negligible effects on the TFP. We
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of per capita capital, kt =

Kt
Lt ,

is given by:
k̇t = vanβt ktα − (δ + n)kt ,

(6)

As usual we denote with lowercase letters per capita variables and with uppercase letters aggregate variables,
thus yt = LYtt denotes per capita output which is given by yt = anβt ktα . Since our focus is on per capita
variables, in what follows we shall refer to per capita capital as capital and to per capita income as income
as a matter of expositional simplicity.
Equations (4), (5) and (6) describe how the interactions between non-speculative and speculative banks
determine the composition of the banking sector which, in turn, by affecting capital accumulation, ultimately
determines the level of economic development. Since the shares of speculative and non-speculative banks
sum to one at any moment in time, the system can be analyzed by focusing on only one of the two shares.
In other words, we can simply concentrate our attention on how the evolution of the share of speculative
banks, st (and, therefore, of the degree of financial contagion), affects capital accumulation. The dynamics
of these two variables are given by the following equations:
ṡt = st [(θ − b)(1 − st ) − η − d]
k̇t = va(1 −

st )β ktα

− (δ + n)kt .

(7)
(8)

Note that in the case we are now focusing on (exogenous θ), the degree of financial contagion (st ) affects the
dynamics of capital, while the opposite is not true. This means that in this setting it is the financial side
to influence univocally the real side of the economy. The above system (7) and (8) admits two equilibria,
E1 = (k 1 , s1 ) and E2 = (k 2 , s2 ), where:

k1 =

k2 =

va
δ+n



1
1−α



va
δ+n



η+b
θ−d



1
1−α

s1 = 0
β
1−α

s2 =

θ−d−η−b
θ−d

(9)
(10)

It is possible to observe that while E1 always exists, E2 does exist only whenever θ > d + η + b and such
a parameter condition determines the stability properties of the two equilibria. Indeed, whenever a unique
equilibrium exists (i.e., θ ≤ d + η + b) E1 is asymptotically stable, while when two equilibria exist (i.e.,
θ > d + η + b) E1 turns out to be unstable while E2 asymptotically stable. Thus, which equilibrium the
economy converges to crucially depends on the number of equilibria, determined by how the risk-transmission
rate (θ) and what we can refer to as the “effective risk-exposure decay rate” (d + η + b) compare. Note
that the effective risk-exposure decay rate depends on the pure risk-exposure decay rate (η) but also on the
default probability (d) and the birth rate of new banks (b). This is due to the fact that the probability
of default, by forcing some speculative banks out of the financial system, and the birth rate, by diluting
the presence of speculative banks in the financial sector (since at birth every bank is non-speculative), both
contribute to increase the risk-exposure decay rate.
In particular, E1 represents what we may refer to as a “non-speculative” equilibrium where the degree
of financial contagion is null (s1 = 0) and thus capital achieves its maximal level (k 1 ) determined only by
economic fundamentals (namely, v, a, δ, n and α). E2 represents what we may label as a “speculative”
equilibrium where the degree of financial contagion is positive (s2 > 0) and entirely determined by financial
factors (namely θ, η, b and d); this implies that capital does not achieve its maximal level (k 2 < k 1 ) since
could alternatively claim that both speculative and non-speculative banks contribute to the TFP, such that At = anβt sω
t where
0 ≤ ω ≤ β measures the efficiency of speculative banks’ intermediation activity in affecting productivity. Apart form reducing
the negative macroeconomic effects associated with financial contagion, this setting would lead to the loss of multiple equilibria
which, as we shall see later, are essential to give rise to nontrivial conclusions. By assuming that ω = 0 we therefore focus on
the most interesting and realistic case.
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it is negatively affected by financial factors. Such factors, indeed, by increasing the share of speculative
banks existing in the economy, decrease the TFP level, and therefore the economic incentives to invest
in capital accumulation. Our above discussion suggests thus that the economy converges towards a nonspeculative equilibrium whenever the effective risk-exposure decay rate is faster than the risk-transmission
rate (θ ≤ d + η + b), while it converges towards a speculative equilibrium whenever the effective decay rate
is slower than the transmission rate (θ > d + η + b). The dynamics of the degree of financial contagion and
capital are shown in Figure 1, in the case in which the non-speculative equilibrium is stable (dashed curves)
and in the case in which the speculative equilibrium is stable (solid curves). It is worth observing that the
evolution of financial contagion is monotonic, and so is the evolution of capital.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (left panel) and per capita capital (right panel) over
time whenever θ ≤ d + η + b (dashed curves) and θ > d + η + b (solid curves), starting from the same initial
conditions, i0 = 0.2 and k0 = 1. Parameter values: α = 0.33, a = 1, v = 0.2, δ = 0.05, n = 0.02, θ = 0.2,
η = 0.1, β = 1, b = 0.03, with d = 0.08 (dashed curves) or d = 0.02 (solid curves).

It is interesting at this stage to emphasize the twofold role of the parameter d in our setting. As a matter
of fact, the banks’ default probability affects not only the capital level in a speculative equilibrium, but also
the effective risk-exposure decay rate (that crucially determines which equilibrium the economy converges
to). As long as two equilibria do exist, that is the effective decay rate is sufficiently low, an increase in
the probability of banks’ default increases the equilibrium capital level, as well; however, as soon as the
effective decay rate becomes large enough, such that only one equilibrium does exist, then capital achieves
its maximal level, which turns out to be independent of the probability of banks’ default (since entirely
determined by economic fundamentals). This suggests that, despite the common wisdom that policymakers
should do whatever is in their power in order to rescue banks from bankruptcy, in order to favor economic
development it might be ultimately most convenient to allow them to default and exit the financial market.
In the end, the increased probability of banks’ default would result in a higher equilibrium capital and
income levels. We can summarize the results as follows.
Proposition 1. In a Solow-type growth model, characterized by equations (7)-(8), in which the risktransmission rate θ is exogenous, the economy converges to the non-speculative equilibrium whenever θ ≤
d + η + b, while it converges to the speculative equilibrium whenever θ > d + η + b. Increases in the probability
of banks’ default (d) may either increase the speculative equilibrium capital level (k 2 ) or allow the economy
to achieve its maximal capital level (k 1 ).
In words, Proposition 1 states that in our framework an approach to economic policy aimed at rescuing
banks no matter what might be detrimental to economic development. Policymakers should, instead, allow
10

banks eventually to fail, since this would ultimately result in higher levels of capital and income. The
intuition behind this result is that a higher probability of default would lead speculative banks out of
the financial market sooner; this will reduce the degree of financial contagion favoring a healthier (nonspeculative) banking system which is conductive to faster capital accumulation and higher income levels.7
This type of conclusion is in line with the results of some recent works (Hart and Zingales, 2014; Heitfield
et al., 2010).8

3.2

Mutual Interdependence between the Financial and the Real Sides

We now extend our baseline model by endogeneizing θ in order to account for the presence of mutual
interdependence between the financial and real sides of the economy. Specifically, we now postulate that
the average number of asset-transactions across banks required for risk to be transmitted is time-varying
and increases with per capita capital as follows: θt = θkt , where  ≥ 0 quantifies the elasticity of the
risk-transmission rate to the capital stock. By assuming that the such a rate increases with capital we
explicitly take into account the fact that, everything else equal, in more developed economies on average a
larger number of transactions between speculative and non-speculative banks is needed before transferring
risk. This might be due, for example, to the role of financial regulation which is generally more stringent in
advanced economies, where central banks’ efforts to promote financial stability are more effective.9 Under
our new assumption on θt and its link with capital, the dynamic equations for per capita capital and the
degree of financial contagion are mutually related as follows:
ṡt = st [(θkt − b)(1 − st ) − η − d]

(11)

st )β ktα

(12)

k̇t = va(1 −

− (δ + n)kt .

Note that in the special case in which  = 0 the model boils down to our baseline setup in which the
transmission rate is an exogenous constant. Simple comparison of the systems (7)-(8) and (11)-(12) reveals
that when the risk-transmission rate is endogenous and positively dependent on capital, the relation between
the economy’s financial and the real sides is no longer unidirectional: while the composition of the banking
sector continues to affect capital accumulation and therefore economic development (see (8) and (12)),
economic development (i.e., capital) now affects the banking sector (see (7) and (11)). As we shall see
in a while this bidirectional relation between the financial and economic systems gives rise to important
macroeconomic consequences.
Exactly as in our baseline model, the above system (11)-(12) admits two equilibria: E1 = (k 1 , s1 ) and
E2 = (k 2 , s2 ). E1 is the same non-speculative equilibrium as in the previous section with null degree of
financial contagion and maximal capital level, as in equation (9). E2 is again a speculative equilibrium
characterized by a positive degree of financial contagion and capital less than its maximal level; clearly,
with endogenous θt the equilibrium values of capital and share of speculative banks associated with the
7

This is consistent with the view that any banking regulation needs a resolution scheme that governs bank failures in order
to solve the trade–off between imposing market discipline and minimizing the effects of such failures on the rest of the banking
system (Beck, 2011).
8
By considering a simple model that abstracts from issues related to the degree of interconnectedness of financial institutions
(which, instead, is the main focus of our paper), and where security markets are complete but consumers cannot pledge future
income or wealth, Hart and Zingales (2014) show that a shock to banks disproportionately affects the agents who need liquidity
the most, reducing thus aggregate demand and the level of economic activity. The optimal fiscal response to such a shock,
however, is to help people, not banks. Therefore, even the special role played by banks “[...] does not necessarily justify banks’
bailouts.” (Hart and Zingales, 2014). Similarly, Heitfield et al. (2010) strikingly conclude: “[...] pumping funds into the financial
system may sustain zombie banks and amplify problems”.
9
Note that we could alternatively claim that, due to the larger degree of complexity of the financial system, in more developed
economies less transactions are needed for risk to be transmitted, that is θt = θkt− . Apart form reducing the beneficial effects
of economic development on the financial system, this setting would lead the speculative equilibrium to be always stable. Our
working assumption instead allows us to focus on the most interesting and probably realistic case.
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speculative equilibrium are different from those in (10) with an exogenous θ. In fact, in order to derive the
equilibrium values of capital and financial contagion in the speculative equilibrium, we need to solve the
following equation for s:
" 
#
 
1−α
β
va
θ
(1 − s) 1−α − b (1 − s) = η + d
(13)
δ+n
Such an equation cannot be solved explicitly in general, nonetheless it is possible to show that a unique
solution always exists (see appendix A). Moreover, from (13) it is also clear that the equilibrium value of the
share of speculative banks now depends (unlike the case of exogenous θ) on economic fundamentals (v, a, δ,
n and α), as well. In order to look at the nature of the relation between the economic and financial systems
in the simplest possible way, we focus on the case in which an explicit solution for (13) does exist, but our
main results extend even to more general setups (see appendix A). This occurs whenever  = 1−α
β , which we
assume to hold true in what follows. Note that such a parametric restriction is very mild since it allows us to
consider situations in which  is smaller or larger than or even equal to unity, according to whether β is larger
or smaller than or equal to 1 − α, respectively. If such a condition is met then the speculative equilibrium
E2 is characterized by the following equilibrium values of capital and degree of financial contagion:
q
1
 1

va β
) (η + d)
b
+
b2 + 4θ( δ+n
1−α
β
va
(1 − s2 ) 1−α
(14)
k2 =
1 − s2 =
1
δ+n
2θ( va ) β
δ+n

As already discussed in the previous section E2 exists only if a certain condition is met, and in this case the
1
va β
condition reads as θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b, requiring what we can refer to as the “effective risk-transmission
1

va β
rate” (θ( δ+n
) ) to be larger than the effective risk-exposure decay rate. Exactly as before, whenever a
1

va β
unique equilibrium exists (i.e., θ( δ+n
) ≤ d + η + b) E1 is asymptotically stable, while when two equilibria
1

va β
exist (i.e., θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b) E1 turns out to be saddle point stable while E2 asymptotically stable.
This suggests that economic fundamentals (v, a, δ, n and α) by determining the effective risk-transmission
rate play an essential role in determining also which equilibrium the economy converges to. Specifically, we
observe that, ceteris paribus, the effective risk-transmission rate increases with the saving rate but decreases
with the depreciation rate and the labor force growth rate.10 In other words, in more developed economies
(i.e., those in which the saving rate is higher, and/or the labor force growth rate and the capital depreciation
rate are lower) the condition for a speculative equilibrium to be reached is, all the rest remaining equal,
more easily satisfied: in such economies the degree of financial contagion is likely to be higher (see equation
(14)).
Regarding the determinants of the equilibrium outcomes in the economic and financial systems, the
same results discussed in the previous section apply apart from the fact that now economic fundamentals
affect the outcome in the financial system as well. The dynamics of the degree of financial contagion and
capital are shown in Figure 2, in the case in which the non-speculative equilibrium is stable (dashed curves)
and in the case in which the speculative equilibrium is stable (solid curves). We now observe that, while
in the case of convergence to the non-speculative equilibrium dynamics are monotonic as in the previous
section, in the case of convergence to the speculative equilibrium the evolution of financial contagion and
capital are non-monotonic, suggesting that the presence of a mutual relation between the economic and the
financial systems might give rise to macroeconomic fluctuations during which phases of economic expansion
and contraction alternate each other. It is worth stressing at this stage that this occurs independently of
the fact that our model is purely deterministic (actually, recall that it is a deterministic approximation of a
stochastic model), thus the result is not driven by the presence of any exogenous source of random shocks,
10

This is a direct consequence of the fact that the transmission rate, θt = θkt , is, for  > 0, an increasing function of per
capita capital and that at equilibrium (see equation (14)) capital depends positively on the saving rate and negatively both on
the labor force growth rate and the depreciation rate.
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as in most theories of economic fluctuations (see, among many others, the path-breaking works by King
et al., 1988a, 1988b).11 Instead, in our setting this result is due to a totally different mechanism based on
the persistent and reciprocal interaction between the composition of the banking sector and the economic
incentives to invest in physical capital12 . Specifically, such a mechanism can be qualitatively explained as
follows. Assume that θt = θktε raises (due, for example to an exogenous increase in θ): this will lead, ceteris
paribus, to a rise in the number of speculative banks (St ) and hence in the degree of financial contagion
(st ), as well; consequently, the share of non-speculative banks (nt = 1 − st ) and the productivity (At = αnβt )
would both decrease; with a lower TFP, per capita income (yt ) and per capita capital (kt ) would ultimately
decrease too and this, in turn, leads to a lower level of θt . With a lower θt we would assist, respectively, to
a decrease in St and st , and to a rise of nt , At , yt , kt , and θt . This process will continue (with phases of
declining capital that precede/follow phases of growing capital) until when a long run equilibrium is reached
in which st , nt , At , yt , kt , and θt remain all constant.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (left panel) and per capita capital (right panel) over
1
1
va β
va β
time whenever θ( δ+n
) ≤ d + η + b (dashed curves) and θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b (solid curves), starting from
the same initial conditions, i0 = 0.2 and k0 = 1. Parameter values: α = 0.33, a = 1, v = 0.2, δ = 0.05,
n = 0.02, θ = 0.2, η = 0.1, β = 1, b = 0.03,  = 1−α
β , with d = 0.5 (dashed curves) or d = 0.02 (solid curves).

As a final remark, exactly as in the previous section banks’ default probability d plays a significant role
not only on the speculative equilibrium capital level, but also on the level of the effective risk-exposure
decay rate, which determines what equilibrium the economy converges to. As long as the effective decay
rate is sufficiently low and a speculative equilibrium exists, an increase in the probability of banks’ default
will increase the capital level, k 2 ; however, if, following the same increase in banks’ default probability, the
effective decay rate becomes too high (compared to the effective risk-transmission rate) then the economy
converges to the non-speculative equilibrium and capital (k 1 ) achieves its maximal level, which is independent
of the probability of default and entirely determined by economic fundamentals. We can summarize the
results as follows.
Proposition 2. In a Solow-type growth model, characterized by equations (11)-(12), in which the risktransmission rate θt = θktε is endogenous and  = 1−α
β , the economy converges to the non-speculative
1

va β
equilibrium whenever θ( δ+n
) ≤ d + η + b, while it converges to the speculative equilibrium whenever
11

Other theories of economic fluctuations based on deterministic settings are related to the existence of equilibrium indeterminacy (see for example, Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Benhabib and Perli, 1994; Boldrin and Rustichini, 1994). Note that,
differently from this branch of literature, our setup gives rise to fluctuations even if the equilibrium is determinate.
12
See Marsiglio and Tolotti (2018) for a model where social interactions within the research industry might give rise to income
fluctuations.
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1

va β
θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b. Increases in the probability of banks’ default (d) may either increase the speculative equilibrium capital level (k 2 ) or allow the economy to achieve its maximal capital level (k 1 ).

Proposition 2 is qualitative identical to Proposition 1 suggesting thus that rather than trying to rescue
speculative banks at any cost policymakers might support economic development by allowing banks eventually to default. However, with respect to a situation in which the risk-transmission rate is fully exogenous,
when it is endogenous the presence of reciprocal interactions between the economy’s financial and economic
sides makes policy decisions more interesting and less mechanical. Indeed, the effective risk-transmission
rate depends positively on the saving rate and negatively on the capital depreciation and population growth
rates. As it is well known, these rates (especially the saving and population growth rates) may greatly differ
not only across industrialized and developing economies, but also within the group of advanced economies.
In terms of our model, all this implies two different conclusions. The first is that, compared to developing
countries (where, ceteris paribus, the effective risk-transmission rate is smaller), in advanced countries the
probability of a bank’s default needs to be significantly high in order to achieve a non-speculative equilibrium characterized by no financial contagion and maximal level of per capita capital and income. The
second conclusion is that, looking instead solely at the group of industrialized economies, ceteris paribus,
the probability of bank’s default needed to achieve a non-speculative equilibrium may differ according to
the individual country’s specific economic fundamentals such as the saving rate, the population growth rate,
the rate at which physical capital depreciates and, last but not least, the efficiency with which financial
institutions are able to affect the TFP.

4

The Spatial Model

Financial contagion can be the result of two different mechanisms: the financial system affects the real side
of the economy (which might feed back on the financial system as well), or one economy affects another
giving rise to geographical patterns of contagion. Thus far, we have focused on the first mechanism showing
the extent to which the financial and real sides of the same economy may be mutually related. We now
focus on the second mechanisms trying to understand how financial contagion occurring in a single economy
may spread and affect other economies as well. Indeed, contagion within the financial system is rarely
limited to domestic boundaries and it often threats the financial stability of the global economy. As an
example of the cross-border implications of financial contagion, Degryse et al. (2010) find that in 2006
a shock wiping out 25% (35%) of US (UK) cross-border liabilities against non-US (non-UK) banks could
lead to financial contagion eroding at least 94% (45%) of the recipient countries’ banking assets. They also
show that contagion risk and the “speed of propagation of contagion” have increased over time during the
1999–2006 period and that contagion is more widespread in geographical proximities.
In order to look at such geographical implications of financial contagion, we extend our analysis to a
spatial framework in which economic and financial activities diffuse across space. We assume a continuous
space structure to represent that the spatial economy develops along a linear city, as in Hotelling (1929).
A similar approach has been recently used to characterize the spatial implications of economic growth and
environmental degradation (Boucekkine et al., 2009; Brock and Xepapadeas, 2010; Capasso et al., 2010; La
Torre et al., 2015, 2018). We denote with nx,t , sx,t and kx,t , respectively the share of non-speculative and
speculative banks and per capita capital level in the position x at date t, in a compact interval [xa , xb ] ⊂ R,
and we assume that there are no diffusion flows through the borders of [xa , xb ], that is the directional
∂n
∂s
∂k
derivatives are null, ∂xx,t = ∂xx,t = ∂xx,t = 0, at x = xa and x = xb . In this framework, any position x may
be interpreted as a specific location while a set of adjacent locations as a region in the spatial economy;
such a possibility to distinguish between different regions allows us to account for the existence of regional
heterogeneity and to understand what this might imply for the entire spatial economy. Different from what
discussed earlier for the a-spatial model, the outcome in the financial system cannot be fully characterized
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by focusing only on the evolution of the degree of financial contagion, ix,t since the population of banks is
Rx
spatially distributed, Bt = xab [Nx,t +Sx,t ]dx, and thus it is not necessarily true that the shares of speculative
and non-speculative banks sum to one in each location x (they do sum to one over the whole spatial domain).
We need thus to analyze the evolution of the share of speculative banks and the share of non-speculative
banks over time and across space, along with their implications on per capita capital, and the spatial model
can be represented though a system of partial differential equation as follows:
∂nx,t
∂t
∂sx,t
∂t
∂kx,t
∂t

∂ 2 nx,t

+ (b + η)sx,t − (θkx,t
− dx )sx,t nx,t
∂x2
∂ 2 sx,t

+ (θkx,t
− dx )sx,t nx,t − (η + b)sx,t
= λ
∂x2
∂ 2 kx,t
α
= λ
+ vanβx,t kx,t
− (δ + n)kx,t
2
∂x
= λ

(15)
(16)
(17)

In the above equations the only difference with the respect to the a-spatial model earlier described is related
to the introduction of a spatial characterization. In each location x economic and financial activities evolve
over time exactly as we discussed before. However, such activities evolve also across space and λ ≥ 0
represents the diffusion parameter which measures the speed at which per capita capital, and the shares
of speculative and non-speculative banks spread across space, which without loss of generality is assumed
to be same for all variables. The spatial diffusion of capital has been recently discussed in a number of
macroeconomic geography papers, where capital diffusion represents the effect of trade between adjacent
locations (Boucekkine et al., 2009). The diffusion of speculative and non-speculative banks can be similarly
interpreted as the effects of business transactions (i.e., trade of assets) between banks operating in adjacent
locations. All parameters in the above equations could be space-dependent but for the sake of simplicity we
assume that only the probability of default is, dx , meaning that different locations may be characterized by
a different banks’ default reflecting differences in local economic policy or legislation.
We wish to understand what are the possible implications of introducing a spatial structure in our
model of financial contagion, and in particular whether trade across adjacent locations, what we will refer
to as a “spatial externality”, might be beneficial for long run economic development. Explicitly analyzing
systems of partial differential equations is cumbersome and goes well beyond the scope of this paper. It
is however possible to characterize some conditions allowing to clearly understand the implications of the
spatial structure. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a spatial Solow-type growth model with no diffusion (λ = 0), characterized by equations
(15)-(16)-(17), in which the risk-transmission rate θt = θktε is endogenous and  = 1−α
β , at each location x
two outcomes are possible:
1
va β
) ≤ dx +η+b then the local economy will converge to the non-speculative equilibrium characterized
(i) if θ( δ+n

 1
1
1−α
va
by k x = δ+n
, s1x = 0 and n1x = 1;
1

va β
(ii) if θ( δ+n
) > dx + η + b then the local economy will converge to the speculative equilibrium characterized
r
r
1
1
va β
va β

 1
2
b+ b +4θ( δ+n ) (η+dx )
b+ b2 +4θ( δ+n
) (η+dx )
β
2
1−α
va
2
2
1−α
by k x = δ+n
(1 − s2 )
and nx =
.
, sx = 1 −
1
1
va β
2θ( δ+n
)

va β
2θ( δ+n
)

Proposition 3 identifies some (sufficient) conditions allowing to characterize the two possible outcomes in
a given location in our spatial economy with no diffusion, which converges either to the non-speculative or the
speculative equilibrium according to how the effective risk-transmission rate and the effective risk-exposure
decay rate compare in each location. If there is no spatial externality (λ = 0) each location is independent
from others and thus, exactly as in our previous a-spatial analysis, if its specific effective risk-transmission
rate is larger (smaller) than its specific effective risk-exposure decay rate it will converge to the speculative
(non-speculative) equilibrium. Note that while the non-speculative equilibrium is spatially homogeneous,
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the speculative one is spatially heterogenous suggesting that economies with similar economic and financial
fundamentals may achieve an equilibrium characterized by different levels of capital and different degrees of
contagion. It is thus possible that some locations within the spatial economy converge to the speculative while
others to the non-speculative equilibrium. In the presence of the spatial externality (λ > 0) each location’s
outcome depends on the outcomes in other locations as well, thus understanding where a given location
within the spatial economy will converge to is not possible. In order to shed some lights on this, we rely
upon some numerical simulations which allow to visually represent the possible outcomes. Let us consider a
framework in which economies in different locations across the whole spatial domain are structurally identical
(also in terms of initial conditions) apart from the probability of default, which is spatially heterogeneous. In
1
va β
particular, let us focus on a situation in which the probability of default is high (such that θ( δ+n
) ≤ dx +η+b
1

va β
holds) in the lateral regions while it is low (such that θ( δ+n
) > dx + η + b holds) in the central region,
thus from our previous analysis we expect that, in the absence of the spatial externality, the lateral regions
will achieve a non-speculative equilibrium while the central region a speculative equilibrium, and thus that
the presence of heterogeneity in the banks’ probability of default will give rise to heterogeneous outcomes
in the spatial economy (see Proposition 3). Understanding whether and how the presence of the spatial
externality affects this type of conclusion is our main goal.

Figure 3: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (top) and per capita capital (bottom), with no
diffusion (left) and with diffusion (right). Probability of default relatively low in the lateral regions.

The implications of spatial externalities can be seen from Figure 3. The figure represents the spatiotemporal dynamics of the degree of financial contagion (top panels) and per capita capital (bottom panels)
in the cases with no (left panels) and with (right panels) spatial externalities. The left panels represent
the outcome in a situation in which λ = 0, meaning that the economy is spatially structured but any
economy located in a specific venue is completely independent from economies located in other venues.
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It is straightforward to note that, exactly as discussed earlier, the predictions of our a-spatial model are
confirmed even in such a spatial framework: in the long run the lateral regions converge to a non-speculative
equilibrium while the central region to a speculative equilibrium. Why this should be the case is obvious:
the introduction of an exogenous spatial structure does not affect in any way the development experience
of single economies since the spatial externality does not play any role and thus each region is completely
independent from the others. The right panels represent instead the outcome in a situation in which λ > 0,
meaning that the presence of diffusion due to trade implies that any economy located in a specific venue is
affected by adjacent economies and thus each economy is no longer completely independent from all others.
In this case we can note that the predictions of our a-spatial model are no longer confirmed, and also lateral
regions converge to a speculative equilibrium. Since banks trade with each others independently of their
specific location, contagion tends to spread across the entire spatial economy affecting the evolution of per
capita capital. In particular the presence of diffusion tends to homogenize the long run spatial outcome,
both in terms of financial and economic activities. With respect to the no diffusion case (left panels), the
degree of contagion in the central region decreases and thus capital increases while contagion increases in
the lateral regions and thus capital decreases. Overall, while the central region benefits from the spatial
externality, the lateral regions suffer from trade spillovers. We can also note that with diffusion the dynamics
of per capita capital and contagion become non-monotonic suggesting that trade can magnify the economic
fluctuations induced by the interactions between the economic and financial sectors.

Figure 4: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (top) and per capita capital (bottom), with no
diffusion (left) and with diffusion (right). Probability of default relatively high in the lateral regions.

The above analysis suggests that because of the spatial externality, lateral regions suffer a reduction in
income levels due to the fall in capital and rise in financial contagion. This occurs because the central region,
due to its local economic policy and legislation, is not able to achieve a non-speculative equilibrium even in
absence of trade spillovers. In such a case, by taking into account the presence of this detrimental effect due
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to trade with the cental region, lateral regions can improve their long run outcome by relying on specific local
policies targeting the effective risk-transmission rate or the effective risk-exposure decay rate. For example,
they could intervene in order to increase the probability of banks’ default. If the probability of default in the
lateral regions increases enough to more than compensate for the negative effect induced by trade with the
central region, then the entire spatial economy will monotonically converge to a non-speculative equilibrium
(see Figure 4). This means that not only lateral regions will achieve a non-speculative equilibrium but also
the central region will: an adequate change in economic policy in some (lateral) regions will benefit other
(central) regions as well, improving the economic and financial outcomes in the entire spatial economy; this
will also dampen the fluctuations in economic activity induced by the interactions between the economic
and the financial systems, promoting a smooth process of economic development. These results suggest that
policy coordination between different regions is essential in order to deal with financial contagion and the
implications of spatial externalities.
Our analysis from Figures 3 and 4 allows us to state some interesting conclusions. Spatial externalities
in the form of trade of assets between banks operating in different regions might be a source of economic
instability: in case of localized shocks, contagion effects may propagate quickly across the entire spatial
economy potentially giving rise to a global crisis, and policy decisions in a single economy are completely
irrelevant (see Figure 3). In order to avoid a global spread of financial contagion, it is imperative that single
economies cooperate with each other: if they do not, a too low probability of default in a single region may
negatively affect other regions as well, meaning that economic and financial policies need to be mutually
determined by taking into account the effects induced by trade spillovers (see Figures 4). We believe that
these very simple and intuitive results can explain quite well the interactions between the economic and
financial systems at world level during the recent global financial crisis.

5

Conclusion

The fact that the real and the financial systems are mutually related has been known for a long time, but
how macroeconomic and financial activities affect each other is still an open question. This paper develops
a simple framework to shed some light on such mutual feedbacks and in particular it tries to characterize
the extent to which financial contagion arising from the financial system propagates to and is determined
by the real economy. Specifically, we rely on an epidemiological approach to describe the transmission of
risk within the banking sector which ultimately determines the degree of financial contagion; by allowing
contagion to affect the TFP, introducing such epidemic dynamics in a Solow-type model of economic growth
is straightforward; then, allowing economic development, measured by the level of per capita capital, to
impact on the risk-transmission between banks permits us to close the loop. Such a framework allows us
to derive some interesting conclusions: (i) the existence of multiple equilibria implies that economic policy
can be effectively used to address the economy towards the speculation-free equilibrium, and this might
simply require to promote banking efficiency by avoiding to rescue banks in distress; (ii) the complicated
interactions between economic and financial systems imply that convergence to the speculative equilibrium
might be characterized by cyclical fluctuations even in absence of random shocks, and such fluctuations
naturally disappear if the economy is addressed to the non-speculative equilibrium. These results suggest
that economic policy may play a fundamental role not only in improving long run (increasing the level
of income per capita) but also short run (dampening the size of business fluctuations) macroeconomic
outcomes. By extending the analysis to a spatial framework to account for spatial externalities we show
that such conclusions are even more relevant in the presence of spatial heterogeneity, since regional policy
if effective enough could improve the macroeconomic outcomes in the entire spatial economy.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to formally characterize the mutual links between
financial contagion and macroeconomic activities. Therefore, we have tried to maintain the analysis as
simple as possible in order to clarify the various mechanisms in place. In order to do so, the analysis has
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been carried out in a purely dynamic setting without considering the optimal determination of economic
and financial policy. Extending the analysis in order to characterize the associated optimal control problem
may provide some further insights on how economic and financial systems are mutually related, both in an
a-spatial and in a spatial framework; moreover, it may permit to quantify the welfare effects associated with
economic and financial policy, allowing to assess thus the effective desirability of certain policies. These
additional tasks are left for future research.

A

A Generalization

In this appendix we show that the results discussed in the body text, based on some specific parametric
restriction ( = 1−α
β ), hold true also if we remove such a restriction. The cost of relaxing this condition is
that we lose the explicit expression for the speculative equilibrium values of the degree of financial contagion
and per capita capital. The equilibrium degree of financial contagion in the speculative equilibrium requires
that equation (13) is verified. The following proposition states an existence and uniqueness result for the
solution of this equation.


va 1−α
Proposition 4. The equation (13) has a unique solution s ∈ [0, 1) if and only if θ( δ+n
≥ d + η + b.
)

Proof. Equation (13) can be rewritten as

f1 (s) = θ

va
δ+n




1−α

β

(1 − s) 1−α =

η+d
+ b = f2 (s)
1−s

(18)



va 1−α
The function f1 is clearly strictly monotone decreasing, with f1 (0) = θ( δ+n
)
and f1 (1) = 0. The function
f2 is monotone strictly increasing instead, with f2 (0) = d+η+b and f1 (1) = +∞. This implies that to have a

va 1−α
)
≥ d+η +b. 
unique solution to (13) is necessary and sufficient that f1 (0) ≥ f2 (0) which implies θ( δ+n

Whenever the condition in Proposition 4 is met, then a unique speculative equilibrium E2 = (k 2 , s2 )
exists. Specifically, the equilibrium value of capital is given by:

k2 =

va
δ+n



1
1−α

(1 − s2 )

β
1−α



1 η+d
=
+b
θ 1 − s2

while the equilibrium value of the degree of contagion is the implicit solution to the following nonlinear
equation:
" 
#
 
1−α
β
va
(1 − s2 ) 1−α − b (1 − s2 ) = η + d
θ
δ+n
In order to analyze the stability properties of this equilibrium, we proceed via linearization. The Jacobian
of the system of differential equations (11) - (12) evaluated at E2 is given by the following expression:
"
#

−1
(θk 2 − b)(1 − 2s2 ) − η − d
s2 k 2 (1 − s2 )
J=
α−1
−vaβ(1 − s2 )β−1 sα2
vaαk 2 (1 − s2 )β − δ − n
It is straightforward to show that J21 < 0 and J12 > 0. The following calculations allow to determine the
sign of J22 and J11 :


δ+n
(1 − s2 )β
J22 = vaα
− δ − n = vaα
− δ − n = (δ + n)(α − 1) < 0
α−1
va
k2


δ+n

J11 = −s2 (θk 2 − b) = −s2
<0
1 − s2
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These conditions imply that the trace of J is negative and the determinant of J is positive which leads to the
conclusion that both eigenvalues of J are strictly negative, suggesting that E2 is asymptotically stable. As
discussed in the body text under the parametric restriction  = 1−α
β , also whenever this condition is not met
a unique speculative equilibrium exists whenever a certain parametric restriction holds true, and whenever
such an equilibrium exists this will be asymptotically stable. Not surprisingly, note that the condition in
Proposition 4 ensuring existence and uniqueness of the speculative equilibrium is a generalization of the
condition discussed in the body text, which indeed can be restored by setting  = 1−α
β . This discussion
suggests that the results discussed in the body text apply even in more general situations. The evolution

va 1−α
)
of per capita capital and financial contagion in the case in which θ( δ+n
≥ d + η + b are illustrated in
Figure 5, which shows that the qualitative behavior of the variables is identical to what discussed in the
body of the paper; the only noticeable difference is related to the fact that the size of fluctuations in capital
and contagion are much larger, suggesting that whenever  is not restricted to take some specific value the
macroeconomic effects of financial contagion can be substantially large.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (left panel) and per capita capital (right panel) over
α
va β
time whenever θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b, starting from initial conditions, i0 = 0.2 and k0 = 1. Parameter values:
α = 0.33, a = 1, v = 0.2, δ = 0.05, n = 0.02, θ = 0.2, η = 0.1, β = 1, b = 0.03,  = 50, with d = 0.02.

B

A Different Formulation

We now present a different formulation of the relation between the financial and economic systems to show
that even in more general setting our main results still hold true. We now assume that the average number
of asset-transactions across banks required for risk to be transmitted increases no longer with per capita
capital but with per capita income as follows: θt = θyt . The relation between financial contagion and capital
accumulation in this case is summarized by the following equations:
ṡt = st {[θa (1 − st )β ktα − b](1 − st ) − η − d}
k̇t = va(1 −

st )β ktα

− (δ + n)kt .

1−α
β ,

(19)
(20)

As in the body of the paper, if  =
it is possible to explicitly find the equilibria. The speculative equilibrium E2 is characterized by the following equilibrium values of capital and degree of financial
contagion:
q
α

 1
va β
b + b2 + 4θ( δ+n
) (η + d)
1−α
β
va
k2 =
(1 − s2 ) 1−α
1 − s2 =
(21)
α
va β
δ+n
2θ( δ+n
)
20

α

va β
In this case, the economy converges to the non-speculative equilibrium whenever θ( δ+n
) ≤ d + η + b, while
α

4
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va β
it converges to the speculative equilibrium whenever θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b. Also in this case increases in the
probability of banks’ default (d) may either increase the speculative equilibrium capital level (k 2 ) or allow
the economy to achieve its maximal capital level (k 1 ). The evolution of per capita capital and financial
contagion are illustrated in Figure 6. We can observe that apart from some quantitative differences in the
level of capital and contagion both during the transition and at equilibrium, from a qualitative point of view
capital and contagion behave exactly as in our earlier formulation. This suggests that our main results hold
true even in more general settings, and no matter the proxy of financial development (capital vs income)
our model is able to effectively characterize the mutual links between the economy’s financial and economic
sides.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the degree of financial contagion (left panel) and per capita capital (right panel) over
α
α
va β
va β
time whenever θ( δ+n
) ≤ d + η + b (dashed curves) and θ( δ+n
) > d + η + b (solid curves), starting from the
same initial conditions, i0 = 0.2 and k0 = 1. Parameter values: α = 0.33, a = 1, v = 0.2, δ = 0.05, n = 0.02,
θ = 0.2, η = 0.1, β = 1, b = 0.03,  = 1−α
β , with d = 0.08 (dashed curves) or d = 0.02 (solid curves).
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